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Ho-fung Hung and Iam-cHong Ip
Hong Kong’s democratic movement and the making of 
china’s offshore civil Society
aBSTRacT
Hong Kong’s civil society has remained vibrant since the sovereignty handover in 
1997, thanks to an active defense by the democratic movement against Beijing’s 
attempts to control civil liberties.  Hong Kong is becoming mainland China’s offshore 
civil society, serving as a free platform for information circulation and organizing 
among mainland activists and intellectuals. 
KEYWoRdS: Hong Kong, China, democratic movement, civil society
InTRoducTIon 
Since Hong Kong’s return to China as a special administrative region (SAR) in 
1997, many commentators and journalists have fretted about the territory’s 
declining liberty and autonomy, as well as its stalled or even reversed demo-
cratic development. Plentiful examples of self-censorship of the press, repeated 
delays in implementation of universal suffrage as promised in the Basic Law, 
and Beijing’s open or tacit interventions into Hong Kong politics despite the 
stated principle of “one country, two systems” suggest that Hong Kong has 
been passively and gradually subordinated to the authoritarian state in Beijing. 
“One country, two systems” is now devoid of all substance, and Hong Kong 
society and politics are being homogenized with those in mainland China. 
This pessimistic portrayal of Hong Kong as a “slowly boiled frog”1 after 1997 
cannot be easily dismissed, as evidence attesting to it abounds. One weakness 
1.  Many commentators in Hong Kong equate the slow tightening of liberty there under Chinese 
rule to the process of “slowly boiling a frog” (wenshui zhuwa), in which the frog does not notice the 
slow increase in temperature and does not resist.
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of this perspective, however, is that it neglects the tenacity of Hong Kong’s civil 
society, which germinated in late colonial times and has actively  defended its 
autonomy since the handover. Despite pressure from Beijing, this civil society, 
which has remained at least as vibrant as before the  handover, has even started 
to resonate with the growing grassroots resistance in mainland China that has 
emerged in recent years. The former colony’s distinct  financial infrastructure 
that originated in colonial times is now enabling Hong Kong to become  China’s 
offshore financial center, facilitating the emergent  internationalization of the 
Chinese currency, the renminbi (RMB).2 Likewise, Hong Kong’s civil society is 
turning into mainland China’s offshore civil society, serving as a clearinghouse 
for information and ideas, a hub of political organizing and exchanges, and an 
open, free platform for activists and intellectuals from the mainland.
The persistence and growth of Hong Kong’s civil society after 1997 was not an 
outcome of any stable institutional protection. Instead, it has resulted from active 
resistance by various social and political actors against Beijing’s persistent attempts 
to constrict such a public space. In what follows, we first outline how Hong Kong’s 
contentious civil society took shape and gained momentum in the 1980s. We then 
explain how this civil society persisted and grew after 1997, and how Hong Kong’s 
post-handover political economy kept Beijing from openly  repressing such a civil 
society. Its tenacious growth, coupled with the  strengthening of the oligarchic 
political structure that Hong Kong inherited, led to the  escalation of contentious 
mobilizations in 2003 and 2010. These alarmed Beijing and successfully forced 
officials to make concessions on Hong Kong’s  political reform and, more signifi-
cantly, to delay draconian anti-sedition  legislation  indefinitely. We will discuss 
the repercussions of these mobilizations among  concerned citizens in mainland 
China. We will then explore how these repercussions, together with intensifying 
exchanges among scholars, journalists, activists, and other active citizens from 
Hong Kong and the mainland, have started to create China’s offshore civil society 
in Hong Kong.
THE RISE  and pERSISTEncE of Hong Kong’S  cIvIL  SocIETY
In the decade following the failed 1967 anti-British insurgency, instigated 
by Chinese Communist Party (CCP)-affiliated organizations in Hong Kong 
2.  Chen Xiaoli and Cheung Yin-Wong, “Renminbi Going Global,” China and World Economy 
19:2 (March-April 2011), pp. 1–18; and Paola Subacchi, “One Currency, Two Systems,” International 
Economics (October 2010, IEBP2010/01), pp. 1–12. 
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under the influence of the Cultural Revolution, leftist groups maintained a 
low profile, having alienated many Hong Kong citizens with their terrorist 
tactics used toward the end of the uprising. At the same time, a new wave 
of student and social movements constituted by labor organizations, teach-
ers’ unions, and community organizations blossomed among the younger 
generation. Activists in these movements criticized both authoritarian rule 
in China and colonial British rule in Hong Kong. They gained coverage in 
local media, increasingly staffed by a younger generation of more critical and 
independent-minded journalists. These movements were the foundation of 
an emerging civil society in Hong Kong.3
Throughout the 1980s and 1990s, the opening of Sino-British negotiations 
and the countdown to Hong Kong’s sovereignty handover created many 
opportunities for this nascent civil society to grow. The British regime, fore-
seeing its inevitable departure, started to initiate long-delayed democratic 
reforms to shore up its legitimacy. It increased the proportion of popularly 
elected seats in the Legislative Council (LegCo).  Through the same period, 
Beijing was eager to build a broad, united front in support of the sovereignty 
handover and promised autonomy and democracy in the future Hong Kong 
SAR (HKSAR). The prospect of political reforms led many social movement 
groups to coalesce into an alliance in pursuit of broader democratization. 
Their alliances later developed into pro-democracy political parties; the larg-
est since its inception in 1994 was the Democratic Party. These parties, in 
partnership with an array of social movement groups, became significant 
forces in defending and building Hong Kong’s civil society in late colonial 
and postcolonial times.
Amid the 1980s efforts to formulate the Basic Law—the post-handover 
mini-Constitution of Hong Kong—Beijing tilted heavily toward the local 
business elite, supporting them in practically all controversial issues. Chinese 
officials vetoed all proposals advocated by the democrats for social reform 
(such as workers’ rights to bargain collectively) and speedy political reform 
(e.g., implementation of universal suffrage in 1997) in the completed initial 
drafts of the Law in late 1988 and early 1989.4 The mounting conflict between 
3.  Lui Tai-lok and Stephen W. K. Chiu, “Social Movements and Public Discourse on Politics,” 
in Hong Kong’s History: State and Society under Colonial Rule, ed. Ngo Tak-wing (New York: Rout-
ledge, 1999), pp. 101–18.
4.  Alvin Y. So, Hong Kong’s Embattled Democracy: A Societal Analysis (Baltimore:  Johns Hopkins 
University Press, 1999).
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Hong Kong’s democrats and Beijing culminated in massive mobilization in 
support of the student movement in China in 1989. Waves of demonstrations 
surged in the colony, with up to one million Hong Kong citizens—one-sixth 
of its population at the time—participating. A number of core democrats 
and social movement groups founded the Hong Kong Alliance in Support 
of Patriotic Democratic Movements (HKASPDM). After the Tiananmen 
crackdown and the full-fledged conservative turn of Chinese politics, Beijing 
labeled the democrats, who had strongly denounced the crackdown, traitors 
collaborating with foreign powers to topple the CCP regime. They continue 
to be so labeled to this day. On the other hand, many Hong Kong citizens 
see the democrats as trusted defenders of Hong Kong’s liberty after 1997, as 
suggested by the stable majority vote they have obtained in nearly all direct 
elections. 
The final version of the Basic Law, passed in 1990, reinstated the promise 
of eventual election of the Hong Kong chief executive and all LegCo seats 
through universal suffrage. But implementation was delayed indefinitely, with 
the document asserting that the former could not occur earlier than 2007 and 
the latter only after 2008. In addition, officials inserted a draconian article 
against subversion, Article 23, requiring the future HKSAR government to 
outlaw any activities, organizations, and publications deemed threatening 
to Beijing. 
After the handover, election of the chief executive was carried out by the 
Election Committee. This committee of several hundred members mainly 
consisted of prominent magnates in the city. These proxies for Beijing fiercely 
opposed universal suffrage for fear that it would end their privileged access 
to the policy making process. Direct election for LegCo seats was limited, 
with Beijing rolling back some of the LegCo democratic reforms instituted 
during the last years of British rule. The openness of the political system fell 
far short of Beijing’s initial promise of universal suffrage.5 
Increasingly marginalized by Beijing, the democratic movement  resorted 
to mass mobilization after 1997 to demand faster democratization. The 
 democrats, who participated enthusiastically in direct elections begun by 
5.  In accordance with the Basic Law’s Article 45, the ultimate goal of Hong Kong’s political 
development is universal suffrage. However, the timetable remains open; the electoral law could be 
amended to achieve it. The Beijing government and pro-Beijing politicians have attempted to delay 
it by promoting the idea of “gradual reform.” On April 26, 2004, the Standing Committee of the 
National People’s Congress explicitly denied the possibility of reaching universal suffrage by 2007 
(for the chief executive) and by 2008 (for LegCo). 
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the British, were active in both community organizing and collective action. 
Besides pressing the quest for formal democracy, they have organized Hong 
Kong-wide campaigns on particular contentious issues since the 1980s. A 
case in point was their cooperation with environmental groups in large-scale 
mobilization against the construction of the Daya Bay nuclear plant near 
Hong Kong following the 1986 Chernobyl disaster. 
The gap between the promise and reality of Hong Kong’s political devel-
opment after 1997 became the impetus for the continuous growth of the 
democratic movement. Every year on the July 1 anniversary of the sovereign-
ty handover, pro-democracy parties and social movement groups organized 
carnival-like demonstrations, creating a broad-based “rainbow coalition” that 
made diverse demands for minimum-wage legislation, gay rights, housing 
rights, and universal pensions. These were unified under the demand for 
universal suffrage. 
Beijing’s choices in eliminating the opposition in Hong Kong were con-
stricted because outright repression was out of the question. Given the exist-
ing vibrant civil society, any open repression would trigger unpredictable 
turmoil in the territory. This would likely jeopardize Beijing’s plan to use 
Hong Kong as an example for any future unification of China and Taiwan. 
Civil unrest would also threaten China’s stated plan to reshape Hong Kong as 
an offshore financial center for internationalization of the RMB, requiring a 
credible legal structure, freedom of the press, and above all political stability. 
Popular rage directed at local ruling circles mounted in Hong Kong as 
the government proved incapable of reviving the economy after the Asian 
financial crisis of 1997–98. Its failure to contain the SARS (Severe Acute Re-
spiratory Syndrome) epidemic in 2003 only made matters worse. At the peak 
of discontent (see Figure 1), the government, under pressure from Beijing, 
initiated the anti-subversion legislation as predicated in the Basic Law in 
Article 23. Many otherwise non-activist scholars, journalists, and librarians, 
as well as the Catholic Church and many Protestant congregations, joined 
the democrats to oppose the legislation; they saw it as a grave threat to exist-
ing freedoms of speech and of association enjoyed since late colonial times. 
The culmination of popular discontent was the massive demonstration on 
the sixth anniversary of the handover on July 1, 2003, when more than half a 
million protesters took to the streets. Spurred by the main theme of opposing 
the Article 23 legislation, the demonstration drew enthusiastic participation 
by youngsters who came of age after 1997. The demonstrators expressed a 
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wide range of concerns including the need for universal suffrage by 2007–08; 
they also issued attacks on business monopolies. 
In response, Beijing acquiesced to an indefinite suspension of the Article 23 
legislation process. In 2005, Beijing fired its handpicked chief executive, Tung 
Chee Hwa, partway through his second term. Tung, also head of a prominent 
business family, had become a primary target for the demonstrators. He was 
replaced in his government post by Donald Tsang, who had been a senior 
bureaucrat late in the colonial administration. By these actions Beijing appar-
ently sought to enable the HKSAR government to sidestep popular charges 
of collusion with big business. 
After making these two concessions, Beijing pushed back against the demo-
crats’  growing demand for universal suffrage in 2007–08. The Standing Com-
mittee of China’s National People’s Congress ruled in 2004 that universal 
suffrage would be out of the question for 2007–08. Given the Hong Kong 
government’s repeated failures to revitalize the local economy, Beijing pressed 
for a Closer Economic Partnership Agreement (CEPA) with Hong Kong in 
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figure 1. Opinion Poll Survey Showing Percentage of Respondents Satisfied or Dissatisfied with 
the Hong Kong Government, 1993–2010
source: Hong Kong Transition Project, Calm after the Storm? Hong Kong People Respond to Reform, <www.
hktp.org/list>, 2010.
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2003 that brought swift economic recovery. The agreement accelerated and 
deepened Hong Kong’s economic and social integration with China, open-
ing the floodgates for mainland-to-Hong Kong flows of capital, visitors, and 
migrating professionals. 
Following this series of concessions and offensives, and coupled with the 
strong economic rebound under CEPA, political confrontation cooled down. 
But under the surface, social cleavages that had spawned the 2003 mobiliza-
tion continued to deepen. Public resentment against big business-government 
collusion erupted under Donald Tsang, and social polarization accelerated 
under CEPA. The integration of Hong Kong and mainland China hastened 
the relocation of businesses to China, jeopardizing both working class and 
middle class jobs in Hong Kong. The huge inflow of Chinese capital inflated 
the cost of living and created asset bubbles.6 The post-2003 economic boom, 
therefore, mostly benefited the business elite and members of the older, prop-
ertied middle class. At the same time, the boom impaired the living standards 
of the lower classes and younger middle class.7  
Beijing’s hardening stance on Hong Kong’s transition to full democracy 
in 2007–08 was paralleled by a growing political consciousness among the 
younger generation following the mobilization against Article 23. This trend 
facilitated the rise of new and more-radical democratic groups, including the 
League of Social Democrats (LSD) and the Civic Party (CP), which stiffened 
efforts to defend Hong Kong’s existing civil society and to demand universal 
suffrage. Both groups performed impressively in the 2008 LegCo election as 
brand new political organizations. In the meantime, a spate of community 
movements organized by diverse groups of students and young intellectu-
als arose in an effort to resist efforts by government and big corporations to 
destroy historic buildings, traditional neighborhoods, and natural wildlife 
habitats to make way for profitable redevelopment projects.8 
6.  Chan Man Hong, “CEPA yu Xianggang Chanye Jingji Kongdonghua” [CEPA and the 
hollowing out of Hong Kong industry and economy], Taiwan Guojia Zhengce Xuekan [Journal of 
Taiwan National Policy] 3:7 (July 2009), pp. 39–44. See also Poon Che Cheong and Joe Wong Fuk 
Kin, “Chong jianmi anpai kan Xianggang yu neidi de jingji jiegui” [On the economic integration 
between Hong Kong and mainland from the perspective of CEPA], unpublished paper, Economics 
Department, Hong Kong Shue Yan College, 2005,  pp. 11–16.
7.  Hong Kong Transition Project, “Protest and Post-80s Youth: Sources of Social Instability 
in Hong Kong,” 2010, <http://www.hktp.org/list/>; see also Hung Ho-fung, “Uncertainties in the 
Enclave,” New Left Review, series 2, no. 66 (November-December 2010), pp. 55–77.
8.  Choi Dong Ho and Yan Kim Ho, Qixia Siyi: Dalangxiwan Baoweizhan [Seven warriors: 
Battle for Tai Long Sai Wan] (Hong Kong: Up Publications, 2010); Agnes S. Ku, “Re-Making Places 
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Together with this continuous mobilization of Hong Kong society, formal 
freedom of speech has been more or less maintained throughout the postcolo-
nial period, thanks to the successful resistance to the Article 23 legislation. But 
many surveys do suggest that self-censorship among journalists and editors 
has been rising, and the media has become more reluctant to criticize the gov-
ernments of Hong Kong and China.9 This may be related to the mainstream 
media’s reliance on investment from local business magnates, who serve as 
Beijing’s proxies in ruling Hong Kong. 
At the same time, however, the popularization of high speed Internet access 
has facilitated the explosive growth of social movement activists’ independent 
and alternative media. These media platforms, which openly scrutinize and 
criticize the Hong Kong and Beijing governments, were instrumental to the 
growth of the new radical wing of the democratic movement as well as the 
spate of community mobilizations against redevelopment projects. Some of 
these media outlets rival the most popular mainstream media. For instance, 
hkreporter.com and MyRadio, both financed and run by Stephen Shiu, a pro-
democracy businessman and charismatic talk show host, became a hugely 
popular online discussion platform and the city’s second largest online radio 
station, respectively.10 The traffic of the former is ranked 22nd in Hong Kong, 
as surveyed by Alexa.com. 
THE EScaLaTIon of conTEnTIouS moBILIzaTIon  
and BEI j Ing’S  dILEmma
The radicalization of the democratic movement and the rise of community 
movements fighting redevelopment culminated in late 2009 and 2010. The 
latter movements developed into a large-scale campaign against the construc-
tion of the Hong Kong-Guangzhou section of the national High Speed Rail 
and Fashioning an Opposition Discourse: Struggle over the Star Ferry Pier and the Queen’s Pier 
in Hong Kong,” Environment and Planning D: Space and Society 30:1 (2012), pp. 5–22; and Hung, 
“Uncertainties in the Enclave.”
9.  Hong Kong Journalists Association (HKJA), Shrinking Margins: Freedom of Expression in 
Hong Kong since 1997 (Hong Kong: HKJA, 2007); idem, Survey on Press Freedom in Hong Kong 
(Hong Kong: HKJA, 2007); and Francis L. F. Lee and Joseph M. Chan, “Professionalism, Political 
Orientation, and Perceived Self-Censorship: A Survey Study of Hong Kong Journalists,” Issues and 
Studies 44:1 (March 2008), pp. 205–38.
10.  Ip Iam-chong, “Hong Kong: The Rise of a New Political Force,” Info-Rhizome: Report on 
Independent Media in the Chinese-speaking World (2008/09) (Hong Kong: Hong Kong In-media, 
2009), pp. 48–68.
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(HSR) system. Movement participants contended that the new railway would 
destroy rural and urban communities within Hong Kong and that its unit 
cost exceeded that of all other segments in the national system. 
Since early 2009, small-scale protests by Choi Yuen villagers, whose 
 village would be demolished to make room for the Guangzhou-Hong Kong 
 Express Rail Link (XRL) construction announced in 2007, have escalated 
into  recurrent demonstrations by thousands of people. Besides drawing 
 villagers and residents in urban neighborhoods also facing disruption, these 
 demonstrations attracted many citizens outraged by the astronomical costs of 
the hastily planned project (estimated at US$8.6 billion for a section of just 
26 kilometers)11 as well as its extensive potential destruction of community life 
and the natural environment. Some professional groups and  pro-democratic 
politicians argued that the XRL would only benefit vested real estate  interests, 
while overloading the local transportation system. Still, LegCo members 
indirectly elected from professional and vested interests groups known as 
functional constituencies (FCs) and usually allied with Beijing almost unani-
mously supported the government’s plan. Protesters in turn developed their 
collective dissent into a quest for full democratization of LegCo through 
abolishing all FC seats. 
The legislative sessions designated for debating and voting on the govern-
ment budget for the project in January 2010 drew almost 10,000  protesters. 
They encircled and blockaded the LegCo building, nearly succeeding in 
 detaining government officials and pro-project legislators inside overnight. 
Although the movement did not forestall the project in the end, its mobi-
lizing capacity and potential to paralyze the government alarmed Beijing. 
 Officials in the Chinese capital had already been perturbed by the New Year’s 
Eve actions of a group of young protesters, somewhat overlapping the anti-
XRL activists, who broke through a police cordon to briefly occupy the back 
entrance to the Liaison Office, the de facto CCP headquarters in Hong Kong. 
These young protesters demanded universal suffrage and release of the jailed 
Chinese dissident Liu Xiaobo. What apparently worried Beijing most was 
that through the spring of 2010, this emerging group joined hands with the 
rising new democratic parties to precipitate a referendum movement, even 
as the government debated political reforms centered on election methods 
for the chief executive and for LegCo in 2012. 
11.  Cheng Wing-Gar Cheng and Wendy Leung, “Hong Kong Accepts $8.6 Billion China Rail 
Link Budget,” Bloomberg, January 16, 2010.
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After Beijing denied any possibility of universal suffrage in 2007–08, the 
democratic movement turned to demand universal suffrage in 2012. Then in 
fall 2009, the HKSAR government put forward a political reform proposal 
for the 2012 elections that ruled out universal suffrage.  In reaction, the LSD, 
later joined by the CP, facilitated a de facto 2010 referendum to mobilize, 
galvanize, and manifest the will of the Hong Kong people for democracy, 
pressuring Beijing to implement universal suffrage in 2012.12 
The plan of the LSD and CP was that the referendum would be initi-
ated by the resignation of their five directly elected legislative councilors, 
each representing one of the five geographical constituencies covering all of 
Hong Kong. Those legislators would then campaign to regain their seats in 
the by-election, on the platform of universal suffrage. Each vote for any of 
the five candidates would then be seen as equivalent to a vote in support of 
the demand, turning the by-election into a referendum. Such a de facto 
referendum would set a precedent for Hong Kong citizens to express their 
collective will on significant issues in the future even though the SAR lacks a 
formal referendum law such as Taiwan’s. Ultimately, the referendum materi-
alized when the five legislators resigned in January 2010, and the by-election 
for their seats was scheduled for May. 
Beijing charged that the referendum movement was a road toward Hong 
Kong independence. The Democratic Party, fearful of angering Beijing, 
 refused to participate and opted for secret negotiations with central Chinese 
officials on modifying the SAR government’s political reform proposal. But 
activists from community movements and alternative online media organiza-
tions participated to help get out the vote. 
In the end, all five of the Democrats who resigned were reelected with 
nearly 90% of the cast votes, and half a million citizens turned out to vote 
despite an organized boycott of the by-election by the political establishment 
and the moderate Democratic Party. In the aftermath of the referendum, the 
young activists became ever more militant in their attempts to sabotage the 
government public relations campaign that advertised the political reform 
proposal. Public opinion polls showed that popular support for the govern-
ment proposal eroded after the referendum, though it was not high to start 
with.13
12.  Hung, “Uncertainties in the Enclave.”
13.  “Mindiao: Zhenggai zhichi diepo yiban” [Opinion poll: Support of government political 
reform proposal dropped below 50%], Mingpao, June 15, 2011. 
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Such escalation of popular mobilization, like the 2003 actions that halted 
the Article 23 legislation, forced Beijing to retreat. Officials finally accepted the 
Democratic Party’s proposal for a piecemeal modification of the 2012 LegCo 
election method that would increase the proportion of seats for directly elected 
legislators. This again demonstrates how Beijing has had to retreat (albeit re-
luctantly) to ensure stability in Hong Kong, in the face of large-scale popular 
mobilization. Later in the year there was a political rumor that Beijing was 
pushing the Hong Kong government to relaunch the stalled Article 23 legisla-
tion before Donald Tsang finished his term as chief executive in 2012. But after 
vociferous opposition by journalists, scholars, and opposition groups, Tsang 
said the legislation would not appear on the agenda during the remainder of his 
term.14 It is possible that Beijing started the rumor to test Hong Kong’s reaction, 
only to delay the effort again after further mobilization loomed. 
The waves of mobilization from the anti-Article 23 protest in 2003 to the 
anti-XRL protest, as well as the referendum movement in 2010, show that 
Hong Kong’s contentious civil society simply cannot be repressed. When 
Hong Kong citizens began defending their civil society under Chinese sover-
eignty, their dissent started to resonate with rights activists and liberal intel-
lectuals in mainland China. Chinese leaders repeatedly warned that Hong 
Kong people should stay away from sensitive mainland affairs just like “well 
water should not disturb river water” (jingshui bufan heshui). This resonance 
is difficult to observe most of the time, but it became more visible at the 
height of mobilization in 2010.
THE  RESonancE  of  Hong Kong’S  dEmocRaTIc  movEmEnT  In 
maInLand cHIna
Given recent intensifying currents between Hong Kong and the mainland—
flow of visitors, circulation of information through high-speed Internet, and 
exchanges among scholars, journalists, and activists—it is inconceivable that 
Hong Kong’s vibrant civil society has lacked impact on the mainland. Still, 
any such impact from mobilization upon China’s heavily constricted civil 
society, where media and voluntary organizations are gripped tightly by the 
party-state,15 was often presumed, and hard to observe. What is significant 
14.  Tsang Yum-kuen, The 2010–11 Policy Address: Sharing Prosperity for a Caring Society (Hong 
Kong: Hong Kong Government, 2010), p. 48.
15.  Nara Dillon, “Governing Civil Society: Adapting Revolutionary Methods to Serve Post-
Communist Goals,” in Mao’s Invisible Hand: The Political Foundations of Adaptive Governance in 
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about the confrontational mobilization in 2010 is that its repercussions in 
the mainland were overt, through both official media and the rising social 
media there. For example, the discontent expressed in Hong Kong’s anti-XRL 
movement helped arouse mainlanders’ interest in critical views on the na-
tional HSR project. A representative of such views was Zhao Jian, a professor 
at Beijing Jiaotong University, who denounced the whole HSR project on 
technological, financial, and safety grounds.16 When interviewed by Hong 
Kong media, he openly expressed support for the anti-XRL movement in 
Hong Kong, urging the activists to make use of the limited democratic sys-
tem to stop the project.17 Zhao’s view was widely circulated among mainland 
netizens, although he refused to comment further on the movement in Hong 
Kong, probably because of pressure from the authorities. 
The anti-XRL campaign was also highlighted in Southern Metropolitan 
Daily (Nanfang dushi bao) and New Weekly (Xin zhoukan), the most popular 
and liberal official newspapers and magazines in China, based in Guangzhou. 
In late 2010, Southern Metropolitan Daily even granted the Annual Award 
of Citizens to Choi Yuen villagers, the backbone of Hong Kong’s anti-XRL 
mobilization. New Weekly selected the movement as one of the 2010 top 10 
“spectated (weiguan) events.” This is a term coined by Chinese netizens to 
refer to a disguised form of political participation using commentary, discus-
sion, or reporting in cyberspace on controversial public events as a means to 
evade state censorship. Such official media endorsement of Hong Kong’s anti-
XRL movement is intriguing because the movement’s actions recall many 
cases of “rightful resistance” in the mainland against forced eviction and land 
grabs by corrupt officials.18 Even though mainland media could hardly express 
direct support for any type of rightful resistance within mainland China, its 
sympathetic coverage of Hong Kong’s anti-XRL campaign can be seen as a 
tacit endorsement of similar protests in the mainland.
China, ed. Sebastian Heilmann and Elizabeth J. Perry (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University, 
Asia Center, 2011); Zhao Yuezhi, “Sustaining and Contesting Revolutionary Legacies in Media and 
Ideology,” in ibid. 
16.  Zhao Jian, “Blind Pursuit Fails to Meet Needs,” China Daily, April 9, 2010, <http://www.
chinadaily.com.cn/opinion/2010-04/19/content_9745174_2.htm>.
17.  “Beijing Academic Urges Hong Kong Lawmakers to Block Costly Express Rail Link,” South 
China Morning Post, October 4, 2009.
18.  For discussion of “rightful resistance” in China, see Kevin O’Brien and Li Lianjiang, Rightful 
Resistance in Rural China (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2006).
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Apart from mainstream media, nascent social media such as Twitter and 
Sina Weibo19 provided vast new platforms for Chinese citizens to exchange 
views and information about variegated public affairs. The scope and speed of 
information flow over the Internet made censorship more difficult.20 During 
the anti-XRL campaign, Southern Metropolitan Daily even sent a correspon-
dent to Hong Kong to follow developments. These concerned mainland-
ers and their Hong Kong counterparts established the common hashtag 
“#stopxrl” to live-tweet rallies against the XRL, allowing mainland netizens to 
follow the mobilization in real time and express solidarity. Many well-known 
liberal bloggers openly supported the anti-XRL campaign. One of them, Li 
Puman, equated the anger of the anti-HSR campaigners to the fury of main-
land citizens whose lives were uprooted by reckless development. Li expanded 
his support of the anti-XRL movement to the level of supporting universal 
suffrage in Hong Kong in his blog: “Usually, the government would tell the 
masses about an apparently bright future, and then let the people pay for 
the bill [of development]. It doesn’t matter whether such a bright future will 
ever come; by the time of disillusion, ordinary people can do nothing. . . . In 
a Hong Kong that has no universal suffrage, what can the people do?”21
Mainlanders’ attention to Hong Kong’s mobilization is not confined to non-
political issues like the anti-XRL movement; it extends to highly sensitive and 
political problems as well, such as the campaign demanding the release of 
China’s political prisoners. In the New Year rally of 2010 mentioned above that 
ended in the storming of Hong Kong’s CCP headquarters, thousands of Hong 
Kong citizens demanded the release of internationally known political prisoner 
Liu Xiaobo. Tweeters from Hong Kong, mainland China, and Taiwan reported 
the whole event live on the Internet and pushed the hashtag “#0101hk” into one 
of the top spots of items discussed on Twitter that day. This is probably the most 
conspicuous cooperation in the past 20 years between citizens of Hong Kong 
and mainland China on political issues. In general, liberal mainland Internet 
19.  The micro-blogging market in China is dominated by Sina and Tencent, which have provided 
weibo (microblog) services after Twitter was blocked in June 2009. Yet, mainland Chinese people 
reach Twitter through proxies, VPNs (virtual private networks), and other tools to get around the 
Great Firewall.
20.  Yang Guobin, The Power of the Internet in China: Citizen Activism Online (New York: Co-
lumbia University Press, 2009).
21.  Author’s own translation. Cited in Xin Yu, “Xianggang Fan Gaotie Xingdong Xiaoying 
Chixu Dalu Wangmin Wangluo Shengyun” [Impact of Hong Kong anti-HSR actions continues and 
mainland netizens offered their support online]. Radio Free Asia, January 19, 2010, <http://www.rfa.
org/mandarin/yataibaodao/gaotie-01192010101249.html>.
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users became increasingly interested in political activism in Hong Kong and 
supported its democratic movement. For example, Ran Yunfei, a nationally 
renowned blogger based in Sichuan Province, once noted that “Free Hong 
Kong is also ours” (Ziyoude Xianggang yeshi womende).22  
Apart from communication via the Internet, the geographical and cultural 
proximity of Hong Kong to South China also helped spread dissident views, 
political idioms, and protest repertoires to the mainland. This was illustrated 
in the “Pro-Cantonese Campaign” (Cheng Yueyu Yundong) in the summer 
of 2010 that invoked the shared vernacular culture and local identity across 
the Pearl River Delta.  In July, the deputy director of the Guangzhou Political 
Consultation Committee suggested that local television channels should switch 
from using Cantonese to Putonghua (Mandarin Chinese) in their prime-time 
shows during the coming Asian Games. This suggestion was taken by local 
people in Guangzhou as a culmination of the government project over the 
past 15 years to promote official Mandarin in place of local Cantonese dialects. 
In response, Guangzhou netizens organized a “Defending Cantonese” rally on 
July 11 at the People’s Park of Guangzhou. They mobilized through the Internet; 
hundreds of citizens showed up, an impressive turnout in Guangzhou. Because 
Hong Kong has been the powerhouse of media and popular culture, nurturing 
several generations of Cantonese-based culture in the Pearl River Delta region, 
it is no surprise that the young Guangzhou protesters, mostly in their teens and 
twenties, sang Cantopop songs from Hong Kong throughout the rally. What is 
remarkable is that many of them even chanted in Cantonese modified political 
slogans that originated in the referendum movement in Hong Kong. During the 
referendum movement, the government advertised its conservative proposal for 
political reform through a public relations slogan, “Set Sail Political Reform!” 
(Zhenggai Qimao), while the radical democrats used the slogan “Go Bust Politi-
cal Reform!” (Zhenggai Shoupi) against the government proposal. In the Defend-
ing Cantonese rally, the most visible slogan was “Set Sail Cantonese, Go Bust 
Mandarin!” (Guangdonghua Qimao, Putonghua Shoupi). After the July 11 rally, 
the netizens organized another on July 25; close to 10,000 citizens showed up, 
manifesting more intense passion than at the preceding one.
After several Hong Kong activists and citizen reporters joined the July 25 
protests in Guangzhou, netizens in both cities co-organized a concurrent dem-
onstration on August 1. The Guangzhou government was on high alert and 
22.  Ran Yunfei, “Ziyoude Xianggang Yeshi Womende” <https://ranyunfei.com/2010/01/1010.
htm>.
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warned of a crackdown. Despite the warning, more than 1,000 Guangzhou 
citizens appeared and demonstrated along Beijing Road in downtown. In Hong 
Kong, about 500 protesters marched to the government headquarters in sup-
port of their compatriots in Guangzhou. Guangzhou police did not crack down 
on the campaigners, only detaining a few organizers for questioning. After 
provincial officials in Guangdong guaranteed that Cantonese would continue 
to be respected and there was no plan to eliminate its use in local official media, 
the movement in Guangzhou subsided.  This episode is remarkable: it was the 
first time since 1989 that mainland and Hong Kong activists took to the streets 
for the same cause. The spread of political slogans from Hong Kong to Guang-
zhou indicates that contentious mobilization in Hong Kong’s civil society has 
been closely watched, admired, and appropriated by citizens in the mainland. 
The campaign in support of Ai Weiwei, an internationally renowned Chi-
nese artist and activist arrested by the Chinese government at the height of its 
crackdown on an incipient homegrown “Jasmine Revolution” in April 2011, 
also illustrates the new dynamic of cross-border activism between Hong Kong 
and the mainland. Openly requesting Ai’s release in the mainland is politically 
impossible, but in Hong Kong, beyond the routine protests by human rights 
activists and democrats, many young activists and artists initiated a street 
art campaign that spread to the mainland. These activists, calling themselves 
“art citizens” (yishu gongmin) created graffiti drawings of Ai accompanied 
by slogans such as "Free Ai Weiwei" and "Who's Afraid of Ai Weiwei?" in 
public areas all over the city. Very soon, similar graffiti appeared in a number 
of mainland cities.23   
The influence on the mainland of the new political culture emerging 
among younger generations of Hong Kong activists is unmistakable. We 
will see in the next section that blossoming alongside this occasional interac-
tion is a more-institutionalized dynamic between Hong Kong and mainland 
civil societies.  
maInLand cHIna’S  offSHoRE cIvIL  SocIETY In Hong Kong
As we showed earlier, following the sovereignty handover Beijing clamped 
down on Hong Kong’s civil society, calling it a “subversive base”—to no avail. 
Beijing’s failed effort to eliminate Hong Kong’s civil liberties was marked 
23.  “Beijing Jingxian Ting Ai, Manyan Chüanguo” [Graffiti supporting Ai appeared in Beijing 
and spread to the whole country], Apple Daily (Hong Kong), April 25, 2011.
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by the successful mobilization against the Article 23 legislation in 2003 and 
its indefinite delay after 2010. The vibrant civil society of Hong Kong, de-
spite its inability to push forward significant policy changes, has been effec-
tive so far in defending the liberty of the SAR.24 This liberal political space 
stands poised to facilitate the development of civil society in mainland China 
through variegated channels. These include participation of mainland visitors 
in Hong Kong’s political activities, facilitation of mainland-oriented non-
governmental organizations (NGOs) in Hong Kong, exposure of more and 
more mainland students to Hong Kong’s civic debate about China, and the 
operation of relatively liberal mainland media organization in Hong Kong. 
As protests, rallies, and assemblies have continued to be part of the daily 
routine in Hong Kong post-1997, they have also become “tourist attractions” 
for mainland Chinese visitors, whose numbers soared after Beijing loosened 
control over mainlanders’ visits under CEPA. The annual count of mainland-
ers’ visits to Hong Kong jumped from 12.25 million in 2003 to 22.47 million 
in 2010.25 Some of these tourists are susceptible to the influences of the culture 
of Hong Kong’s civil society. Increasing participation of mainland visitors in 
the annual June 4 candlelight vigil in Hong Kong commemorating Tianan-
men is a case in point. 
Since the first anniversary of the crackdown in 1990, the candlelight vigil 
rally at Victoria Park in the Causeway Bay District has become a regular 
venue at which organizations concerned about human rights in China hold 
forums and distribute publications. A noteworthy trend, as noted by local 
media, is the increasing presence of mainland tourists joining the vigil. Time 
and again, the SAR government has tried to discourage citizens’ participation, 
denouncing the 1989 student movement as subversive or repressing part of 
the commemoration, for example, in 2010 when police moved to confiscate a 
re-creation of the Goddess of Democracy statue.26 But these moves by officials 
have backfired, only driving up the number of vigil attendees (see Table 1). 
At the same time, a wide variety of rights groups and other NGOs 
dedicated to progressive change in mainland China have been settling in 
24.  Ma Ngok, “Social Movement and State-Society Relationship in Hong Kong,” in Social 
Movements in China and Hong Kong: The Expansion of Protest Space, ed. Khun Eng Kuah-Pearce and 
Gilles Guiheux (Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press, 2009), pp. 45–64.
25.  Hong Kong Tourism Board, Annual Report 2004/2005 (Hong Kong: Hong Kong Tourism 
Board, 2005), p. 31; and idem, “Release of Provisional Visitor Arrivals for 2010,” press release, Janu-
ary 7, 2011.
26.  The police returned the statue to protesters a few days after confiscation.
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Hong Kong since late colonial times. This trend was not interrupted by 
the  sovereignty handover. Groups including Human Rights Monitor and 
Amnesty  International (Hong Kong) have been active in public educa-
tion, disseminating reports on Chinese human rights conditions. Labor 
groups emerging from within Hong Kong, such as Students and Scholars 
against Corporate  Misbehavior (SACOM), have organized campaigns to 
 investigate working conditions and advocate labor rights in mainland 
factories. 
Chinese political exiles have also set up their own groups in the city. 
Han Dongfang, a well-known labor union organizer during the Tiananmen 
 protests of 1989, was arrested, imprisoned, and expelled to Hong Kong in 
1993. He founded China Labor Bulletin to collect and disseminate infor-
mation about Chinese labor activism. Han has maintained and expanded 
contacts with labor activists, lawyers, and intellectuals in the mainland and 
table 1. Number of Attendees of the Candlelight Vigil on June 4, 1990–2011
Year Police’s Figure HKASPDM’s Figure
2011 77,000 150,000 
2010 113,000 150,000
2009 62,000 150,000
2008 15,000 48,000
2007 27,000 55,000
2006 19,000 44,000
2005 22,000 45,000
2004 48,000 82,000
2003 Not available 50,000
2002 18,000 45,000
2001 Not available 48,000
2000 Not available 45,000
1999 Not available 70,000
1998 Not available 40,000
1997 Not available 55,000
1996 16,000 45,000
1995 16,000 35,000
1994 12,000 45,000
1993 10,000 40,000
1992 28,000 80,000
1991 60,000 100,000
1990 80,000 150,000
source: Joseph M. Chan and Francis L. F. Lee, “Why Can’t Hong Kong Forget 
the June 4th Incident? Media, Social Organization, Nation-State, and Collective 
 Memory,” Mass Communication Research 103 (April 2010), pp. 215–59, p. 218; Ming 
Pao, June 5, 2010, and June 5, 2011.
Hung and Ip  /  Hong Kong’S  cHangIng RoLE   •  521
worked closely with international labor organizations. His operation in Hong 
Kong remains intact thus far. The Center for Human Rights and Democracy, 
set up by Lu Siqing, another 1989 activist, is a news agency in Hong Kong 
specializing in Chinese human rights. Other repressed voices from mainland 
China, such as the banned religious organization Falun Gong as well as vari-
ous victims of forced eviction and official corruption, are often heard in Hong 
Kong. The above-mentioned groups and individuals can freely produce and 
circulate their publications, many of which are deliberately distributed to 
visiting mainland tourists. The continued existence of these people, groups, 
and outlets in Hong Kong, made possible by the people’s struggles against 
the legal and political restrictions on civil rights and freedom such as Article 
23 legislation, has created an offshore civil society for China. 
Besides providing a platform for civic participation in China, Hong Kong 
is also becoming a support center for China’s nascent NGO sector. Since the 
1995 Beijing Conference on Women, the Chinese government has allowed 
a homegrown NGO sector to develop as a response to the demands of the 
international community. But this sector is still subject to strict governmental 
surveillance, restriction, and occasional crackdowns.  Many NGOs also con-
front difficulties in registration, fund-raising, recruitment, and institutional 
development. Some prefer to register as associations or corporations in Hong 
Kong and look for local and international funding sources. At the same time, 
many international NGOs, such as Greenpeace and Oxfam, have used Hong 
Kong as a base and springboard for their development in mainland China 
since the 1990s.
Hong Kong is not merely a meeting place for local, international, and 
mainland NGOs. It also functions as a learning center for mainland activists. 
Hong Kong academics and NGO professionals organize capacity-building 
programs for Chinese NGO campaigners, administrators, and volunteers to 
help them develop tactical and organizational skills for their engagement with 
the Chinese government. For instance, the Center for Civil Society Stud-
ies, affiliated with the Chinese University of Hong Kong, has been working 
closely with mainland NGOs, universities, and local governments on NGO-
related training, research, and consultancy. The actual outcome is yet to be 
seen, but in the long run these cross-border NGO networks will certainly 
contribute to the development of Chinese civil society. 
In the meantime, as illustrated by Table 2, the soaring number of mainland 
students and scholars in Hong Kong universities in recent years has spawned 
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a new dynamic in local and mainland intellectual circles. Many of these 
mainland students, trained to be very cautious in expressing their political 
views, are exposed to the culture of free political discussion in Hong Kong. 
In 2009, Chan Yi-Ngor, president of the Student Union of Hong Kong 
University, denounced the 1989 Beijing student movement and accused its 
leaders of causing chaos in Tiananmen Square. He said that they should be 
responsible for the resulting bloody confrontation. He expressed support for 
the government crackdown and denigrated the student leaders as “runaway 
student leaders.” Some local students and alumni from the university found 
Chan's remarks disrespectful to the victims of 1989 and launched a campaign 
to recall him. The ensuing heated debates and recall referendum involved 
many mainland students who had learned little about the Tiananmen Square 
incident during their previous political education. No matter which side they 
supported, it was their first opportunity to engage freely in public discussion 
through open forums and “democracy walls,” an established institution for 
public discussions among university students in Hong Kong since the 1970s. 
Historically speaking, these walls also continue the legacy of the “Democracy 
Wall Movement” and the “Beijing Spring” phenomena in China. 
table 2. Share of Mainland Students in Total Enrollment in Hong Kong Universities, 1996–2001
Year
Mainland Undergraduate
Student as % of  Total
Mainland Postgraduate
Student as % of  Total
All Mainland Students
as % of  Total
1996/97 0 5.5 1.3
1997/98 0 6.3 1.5
1998/99 0.1 6.4 1.6
1999/00 0.4 7.1 2.0
2000/01 0.7 7.4 2.3
2001/02 1.1 9.2 3.0
2002/03 1.3 10.4 3.5
2003/04 1.7 12.6 4.3
2004/05 2.5 15.6 5.2
2005/06 3.9 21.3 7.0
2006/07 5.7 26.8 9.2
2007/08 6.9 29.8 10.6
2008/09 7.9 33.9 11.9
2009/10 8.1 38.9 12.7
2010/11 8.1 40.7 13.0
source: Hong Kong Transition Project, Calm after the Storm? p. 90.
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Some mainland students have even transformed themselves into active 
participants in Hong Kong’s democratic culture. For example, following the 
July 2011 HSR accident in Wenzhou, Zhejiang Province, that killed at least 
40 passengers, Hong Kong media vociferously expressed skepticism about the 
official explanation for the accident and questioned the government’s rescue 
effort as well as the handling of the train wreck. Mainland media were equally 
critical initially, only to be muted later while Hong Kong’s coverage and de-
bate continued. Apparently influenced by this persistently critical concern, 10 
mainland students in Hong Kong issued an online petition letter requesting 
Beijing to fully investigate the accident.27 
In another example, the visit of Vice Premier Li Keqiang to Hong Kong 
University on August 18, 2011, instigated a heated debate in Hong Kong 
because of the exceptionally high level of security during the visit. The local 
police took over campus security, preemptively detained would-be student 
protesters, and restricted media access to the venue during Li’s visit. Compar-
ing this heavy-handed approach to more relaxed security during earlier visits 
to Hong Kong universities by Chinese leaders, many local commentators and 
politicians lamented the increasing disrespect for civil liberties and the law by 
the police. Alumni and students meanwhile expressed resentment over the 
university’s loss of dignity, autonomy, and freedom stemming from the police 
takeover of campus security and aggressiveness toward student protestors. 
During a rally that denounced the police action attended by thousands of 
Hong Kong University alumni, faculty, and students, at least two mainland 
students stepped forward to address the participants. They spoke about how 
they valued Hong Kong as the last bastion of liberty and freedom of speech 
in China, how they appreciated the feeling of “liberation” once they arrived 
in Hong Kong, and how important the defense of such public space is.28 
Despite persistent worries in Hong Kong about the erosion of civil liber-
ties in general, and the loss of freedom of speech through manipulation of 
local media by pro-Beijing elites in particular,29 Hong Kong is becoming an 
alternative Chinese media hub where relatively liberal Chinese media organi-
zations can target a mainland audience. The Chinese media industry, which 
27.  “Liugang Neidi Sheng Lianshu Cucha Dongche Canju” [Mainland students in Hong Kong 
petition for investigation of high speed rail tragedy], Apple Daily, August 3, 2011.
28.  “Shouhu Zhongguo Zuihou Ziyoudi” [To protect that last land of freedom in China], 
Mingpao, August 28, 2011.
29.  HKJA, Shrinking Margins.
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has rapidly marketized since the 1990s, is still subject to official censorship 
and ownership control. Some Chinese media workers and investors with 
connections to official media and the Chinese government have moved to 
Hong Kong seeking more room to maneuver, being unable to operate freely 
in the mainland. 
Phoenix Television, founded in 1996, is a Hong Kong-based Putonghua 
satellite television broadcaster serving the Greater China market. Its share-
holders include media and telecommunications companies from China, and 
well-connected elites such as its chief executive officer (CEO) and founder 
Liu Changle, who reportedly has a background with the People’s Liberation 
Army (PLA). Phoenix Television’s 24-hour news channel, established in 2001, 
covers news from mainland China, Taiwan, and Hong Kong,  including events 
not covered by mainland media such as elections and protests in Taiwan and 
Hong Kong. In 2003, the firm was granted landing rights (i.e., permission 
to have its satellite signals received) by the Chinese State Administration 
of Radio, Films, and Television (SARFT). Many of Phoenix TV’s anchors 
and talk show hosts such as Dou Wentao, Xu Zhidong, and Leung Mantao 
(Liang Wendao) are not shy about commenting on sensitive topics. Among 
them, Leung is an exemplar of the new Hong Kong-China cultural dynamic. 
Having grown up in Hong Kong and Taiwan, he has been active in cultural 
criticism and social activism since the 1990s. Late in that decade, he began to 
work as host and guest speaker for public affairs programs reaching millions 
of mainland viewers including Behind the Headlines with Wentao on Phoenix 
TV. With his knowledge, eloquence, and humor, he has established himself 
as a prominent critic of China’s government, social malaises, and cultural 
phenomena. He has contributed to major official newspapers, and his books 
have ranked high on the best-seller charts in the mainland. 
Sun Television, founded in 2000, is another Hong Kong-based satellite 
television company targeting a mainland Chinese audience. In 2005, Chen 
Ping, a businessman who was a liberal think-tank intellectual in the 1980s and 
left his position in the Chinese government after 1989, acquired the company 
from the couple Wu Zheng and Yang Lan, a pro-Beijing businessman and 
an ex-CCTV (China Central Television) anchor, respectively. Chen recruited 
a number of Chinese liberal intellectuals as talk show hosts and released 
independent documentaries, some of which were produced by social and 
cultural activists such as Ai Weiwei and Ai Xiaoming. After Sun Television’s 
landing rights were revoked by SARFT in November 2010, likely because 
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its programs often conveyed dissident views, it moved its headquarters from 
Shanghai to Hong Kong. As Chen has noted, his company is attempting to 
take advantage of Hong Kong’s freedom and rule of law to establish inde-
pendent media for exchange and propagation of cultural ideas and political 
views.30 Although Sun cannot legally broadcast in the mainland, mainland 
residents can still freely receive its satellite signal, watch its programs online, 
and read its online magazine. 
Another new contribution of Hong Kong to Chinese media is book pub-
lishing. Hong Kong, not subject to any political censorship in publication, 
is fertile ground for publishing houses targeting mainland readers; publish-
ers offer popular titles ranging from exposés of mainland corruption and 
collections of confidential official documents such as The Tiananmen Papers 
to controversial memoirs such as Mao: The Untold Story and Zhao Ziyang’s 
memoirs. Many local bookstores, particularly those in the airport, and sou-
venir shops in tourist hotspots are filled with mainland visitors perusing their 
stocks of politically sensitive books banned in the mainland.  Mainland visi-
tors now account for more than half of the sales of many titles. Attendance 
of mainlanders at Hong Kong’s annual book fair has grown so rapidly that 
since 2009 the organizer has promoted the event in mainland China as a 
tourist attraction.31 
In sum, we see that the persistence of civil society and general political 
freedom in Hong Kong, despite stagnation and setbacks in the city’s democ-
ratization, is turning Hong Kong into the only place in China where the 
CCP government can be criticized overtly. Sensitive political histories like 
the 1989 democratic movement can be freely discussed, and reports about dis-
sidents and conflicts in China can be openly circulated. With the intensifying 
economic and social integration between Hong Kong and mainland China 
and the mounting inflow of mainland visitors, including scholars, students, 
NGO activists, and journalists, the existence of such civil society will not 
only shape the political development of Hong Kong but also that of China. 
Indeed, it is not only a civil society of Hong Kong but also an emerging civil 
society for mainland China.
30.  Zhang Jieping, “Yangguang Weishi Nianju Ganyan Liliang” [Sun Television consolidates the 
power of courage to speak], Yazhou Zhoukan [Asia Weekly] 24:40, October 10, 2010, <http://www.
yzzk.com/cfm/Content_Archive.cfm?Channel=br&Path=2235488802/40br1a.cfm>.
31.  Jonathan Cheng, “China’s Bookstore: Why the Chinese-reading World Still Flocks to Hong 
Kong,” Wall Street Journal, July 17, 2009, <http://online.wsj.com/article/SB124770567529348929.
html>.
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concLuSIon 
According to the Sino-British Joint Declaration and later the Basic Law, the 
status quo of Hong Kong, including its civil liberties and political freedom 
established since the 1970s and 1980s, should remain “unchanged” after ret-
rocession in 1997 for at least 50 years. The same documents also promised 
continuous democratization of Hong Kong’s government until the realization 
of universal suffrage. These promises, together with the fear that Hong Kong 
would be politically and culturally assimilated into the mainland, became 
the impetus for the democratic movement. This movement, built upon the 
vibrant civil society that sprang up in the form of variegated social movements 
and critical journalism in the 1970s, has been striving to defend preexisting 
political freedom in Hong Kong and since late colonial times has demanded 
genuine universal suffrage.
Under Beijing’s constraint that it could not resort to open repression in 
dealing with the democratic movement, together with Hong Kong’s role 
as China’s offshore financial center and its utility as a showcase of “one 
country, two systems” to Taiwan, Hong Kong’s democratic movement and 
civil  society have proven to be tenacious. Still, with the entrenched alliance 
 between  Beijing and the Hong Kong business elite against democratization, 
progress toward universal suffrage has been disappointing. Many activists 
now believe that genuine universal suffrage in Hong Kong will never come 
unless China democratizes. On the other hand, the democratic movement so 
far has  succeeded in defending Hong Kong’s established civil society against 
Beijing’s  attempt to tighten its control. This success was possible because 
 Beijing yielded to popular pressure, and the repressive Article 23 legislation 
was delayed, once in 2003 and again in 2010. Such legislation, if implement-
ed, would destroy the foundation of Hong Kong’s civil society, including 
freedom of speech and freedom of association. 
Hong Kong’s growing civil society under Chinese rule is becoming 
 mainland China’s offshore civil society. The case of Hong Kong complicates 
the conventional definition of the term “civil society,” which usually refers 
to an ethical-political community of citizens under a system of rule and 
bounded by its territory.32 On the contrary, Hong Kong’s civil society, as an 
32.  Jean L. Cohen and Andrew Arato, Civil Society and Political Theory (Cambridge, Mass.: 
MIT Press, 1994), pp. 84–87.
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offshore space, resides simultaneously inside and outside China’s sovereign 
power. It not only inspires rights activists, bloggers, and liberal intellectu-
als in the mainland but serves them as a clearinghouse for information and 
ideas. Hong Kong is also a hub of NGOs and media organizations from the 
mainland and for the mainland. Rights activists and liberal intellectuals from 
there are shrewdly taking advantage of this unique space to connect with one 
another, with the outside world, and with their audiences. It is still too early 
to tell how much this offshore civil society can contribute to social and politi-
cal change in the mainland, but its potential should not be underestimated. 
The accelerating social and economic integration between Hong Kong and 
mainland China that sends hundreds of thousands of mainland scholars, 
students, and other visitors to Hong Kong every year is exposing them to 
opportunities for political participation and civic exchange unimaginable at 
home. 
Historically, Hong Kong played a similar role as an offshore civil society 
in Chinese politics at the turn of the twentieth century. The border was wide 
open, and modern China’s founder Sun Yat-sen, together with many other 
Chinese reformists and revolutionaries, used the British colony’s relatively free 
political space to advocate and struggle for change in China.
The continuous survival and growth of Hong Kong’s civil society today, 
however, is not guaranteed by any stable institutional arrangement. It is con-
tingent upon the ability of local citizens to defeat repeated attempts by Beijing 
to wrap Hong Kong in an authoritarian straitjacket. It is nearly certain that 
Beijing will try again to rein in this space by reenacting the Article 23 legisla-
tion, which will again trigger resistance and contentious mobilization among 
Hong Kong citizens. Given the increasing significance of Hong Kong’s civil 
society to the mainland, the stakes of any prospective conflict will be much 
higher than the political development of Hong Kong alone. This will be an 
organic part of the battle over the long run for political reform in China.
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